Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942 by David Durand
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942




Publication Date: June 1942
Chapter Title: Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942
Chapter Author: David Durand
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9268
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 40).>.<..x-.= > <
4 1-ft
-_-
DAVID! DURAND HNATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCI I
Officers, Directors, and Staff
V. LEONARD CRUSt. Chairman
N. I, SroNE, l'resi(Icnt
C. Roi.n Novs, Vice-Prcsidciit
SIItl'ARD NIORCAN, Treasurer
W. J. CAR.soN, Executive Director
MARTHA ANDERSON, Editor
Directors at Large
ChESTER I. BARNARD, I'resident, Ncim' Jersey Bell lelepilone Company
1)Avrn FRIDAY, Consulting Economist
OSWALD W. KNAuTI1, President, Associated Dry Goods Corporation
ii. W. LMDLER, Executive Director, league for Industrial Democracy
SJIEI'ARD MORcAN, t'iee-!'resident, Chase National Batik
GE0R(;EF. ROBERTS,Eco,iotnic Adviser, National City Bank
BFAEDSLEY RuMI., Treasurer, B. H. Macy and Company
STANLEY RUTTENISF.RC, Economic Division, Congress of Industrial
Organizations
HARRY SCIIERaAN, President, Book-of 'the-Mont/i Club
GE0RCFSouLF, Director, 7/ic Labor Burean, Inc.
N. 1. SToNE, Consulting Economist
Directors by University Appointment
E. W. BAKER, Yale Guy STANTON FoRD, Minnesota
C. CANnY BALDERSTON, Pennsylvania ii. M. GROVES, Wisconsin
W. LEONARD CRUSh, Harvard WESlEY C. MITCIILLL, Columbia
E. E.. DAY, Cornell 'F. 0. YNTEMA. Chicago
F. W.'/.IMsuRMANN, North Carolina
Directors Appointed by Other Organizations
PERCIVAl. F. BRUNDACE, A,ncriean institute of Accountants
SPENCFR MILLER, JR., American Federation of Labor
C. REINOLD Noyrs, American Economic Association





Sosossox FAISRICANT G. H.MOORE
MILTON FRIEDMAN R. J. SAULNJER





Technical Paper: June 1942
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1819 Broadway, New YorkI wish to take thisopportunity to express SilI(CFe gratitude
to all individuals and organizationswho contributed data
or inspiration to this study,or who otherwise assisted in its
preparation. At the same time, I donot wish to make any
OflC respon3il)Ie for my conclusionsoi- my interl)retations of
statistical data.
Assistance in the preparationof the materials used iii
this study was furnished bythe personnel of the \Vork
Projects Administration forthe City of New York, Official
Project No. 765-97-s-I 3Corporate Bond Study.
For data, I am particulailgrateful to my colleagues of
time Corporate BondProject: W. B. 1-lickinaim, whowas PCI'-
sonally responsible forsupervising the compilation of the data oncoroorate bond yields and who wasat my elbow
with explanations andsuggest ions throughout the
tion of the study; AlbertS. Thomas, whowas of invaluable
assistance in gatheringmaterial on equipment trust offer-
ings; Melvin W. Brethouwer,Administrative Director of time
Project; and Harold G.Frame, Technical I)irector.
For inspiration, Iam particularly grateful to Winfield
W. Riefler of the Institute forAdvanced Study and Chair-
man of the Committee on Research inFinance. Throughout
this study, he has consultedwith rue freely and providedme
with valuable constructivecriticism.
I also extend thanksto Marjorie Miller and H. Irving
Forman for preparing thecharts; to George C. Haasand
Henry C. Murphy of the UnitedStates Treasury, for advice
and data ongovernment bond yields; to Moody's Investors
Service, Standard and Poor'sCorporation, and Stroud and
Company, for data; to E. L.\'ogelius of Moody's Investors
Service; to Pauline Reinsch andMartha Anderson, for edi-
torial assistance; andto Ralph A. Young, Director ofthe
Financial Research Program forgeneral suggestions onpres- entation and organization.
Copyright, 1942, by NationalBureau of Economic Research,Inc.
1819 Broadway, New York,N. Y. All Rights Reserved
Manufactured in the U. S. A. bythe Academy PressContents
PREFACE, by Win field W. Riefler
BASIC YIELDS OF CORPORATE BONI)S, 1900-1942,
by David Durand 3
Yield Data from Corporate Bond Project 4
Other Yield Data 8
The Basic Yield Curves 9
Reliability of the Basic Yield Curves 1 0
Special Errors in the Short Term Estimates 1 2
Long Term Basic Yields am! Other Corporate Bond Series 14
Treasury Bonds and Basic Yields 1 5
Long and Short Term Basic Yields 1 6
Sl1ort Term Basic Yields and Other Series iG
Implications of the Basic Yield Estimates i8
The Relation Beiween Long and Short Term Bond Yields iS
Bond Yields and Bond Prices 19
Coupon Rate and Its Effect on Yield 20
Investment Policy 2 1
The Market Rating 2
Notes 22
TABLES
iBasic Yields of Corporate Bonds, First Quarter, i 900-1942,by
Term to Maturity r)
2Basic Prices of Corporate Bonds Corresponding to BasicYields,
First Quarter, 1929-30 and 1941-42, by Term toMaturity 20
CHARTS
iLong Term High Grade Corporate Bond Yields, 1900-1 942 14
2Basic Yields and United States Trcasury Bond Yieldsfor 20-
Year Maturities, i 920-1942
3Long and Short Term Basic Yields, 1900-1942 i6
4Superimposed Basic Yield Curves, i 900-1942 17
rShort Term Money Rates, 1900-1942 i8
Basic Charts, 1900-1942 25HIS STUDY of basic yields is oneof a projected series utilizing the
data compiled by the Corporate Bond Projectof the Financial Research
Program, a Work Projects Administrationundertaking sponsored by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,supervised by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, and carried onwith the cooperation of
several public agencies and private investmentservices. The purpose
was to compile a comprehensivestatistical record of bond market expe-
rience from 1900 to 1938. The record includes data onprices and yields,
quality ratings and performance, (let ault experience,bond characteris-
tics such as callability and type of lien, and manyother pertinent mat-
ters. For those who wish a moredetailed description of the Project, the
National Bureau has prepared a special mimeographedbooklet which
may be had on applicationfor fifty cents.
The basic yield study was conducted for two distinct purposes.The
first was to solve a technical problem encounteredby the Project. The
Project desired some method of measuring what maybe called the
'market rating' of bonds, for comparison with thequality ratings of the
investment services. The market rating ofthe quality of a bond is the
combined opinion of narket traders and is reflectedsomehow in the
yield at which the bond is traded. Several methods werediscussed and
discarded before it was decided that the market rating of anybond should
be the difference between its yield and that of thehighest grade bonds
of similar maturity: a small difference would indicatehigh quality; a
large difference, low quality. The basic yield study wastherefore under-
taken to provide the necessary standard of comparison: to measurethe
yield on the highest grade bonds of all maturities. Althoughthese basic
yields are not the equivalent of a theoretically riskiess rateof return,
they probably do represent the closest approximation tothat rate of
return attainable by empirical observation.
The second purpose was to augment ourknowledge of the structure
of interest rates, which at present is largelylimited to long term bond
yields and such short term rates as commercial paper,time and call
money, rediscount rates.Additional knowledge of short and medium
term bond yields is needed toround out the picture. The basic yield
estimates provide factual data germane toseveral widely different fields
of inquiry, e.g., the theoretical discussion ofthe relation between long
and short term interest rates, the analysis of theeffects of interest rateson economic fluctuations, and the problem ofan effective arrangement
of n!aturjtjcS in investment portfolios.
This present study is the result of thecooperative participation of
the economics staff of the Institutefor Advanced Study in the Financial
Research Program of the NationalBureau. Our staff has been keenly
interested in this Program from itsinception and has actively assisted
in the planning and developmentof the basic research it has undertaken
into financial problems.The Institute therefore welcomed theoppor-
tunity to make its facilitiesavailable to Mr. Duranci so that he could
develop these basic yieldestimates. The materials assembled by the
Corporate Bond Projectconstitute a rich body of data for empirical
studies of a vitalsector of finance. The Institute hopes that it will be
able tocooperate further in their analysis, andso enhance our social
knowledge of the functioningothe market for long term capital.
WINFIELD W RIEFLER
In/jt ute for Advanced Study
Chairman, Co,nmi(tee on Research in Finance
National Bureau ofconornjc ResearchHE BASIC YIELD was conceived as a practical analogue to thatstrictly
theoretical entity, the put'c interest rate. The latter is defined as the
rate that would be realized if three hypothetical conditions wereful-
filled:(i) if interest and principal were certain to be repaid according
to contract; (2) if interest and principal were certain to be repaidin
currency of the same purchasing power, which implies a stableprice
level; () if no administrative costs were entailed in making, holding, or
marketing investments. The basic yield, however, is defined as the yield
of the highest grade bonds actually traded in the market, and it there-
fore denies all three conditions assumed for the pure interest rate. (1)
Although high grade bonds arc probably among the safest investments
known, at least in terms of contractual repayment, even the best are
not absolutely safe.(2) Since high grade bonds offer almost no protec-
tion against a rising price level, their market yield should, and probably
does, reflect the market's expectations of future price changes. () The
market yield on high grade bonds is neither the investor's net return nor
the borrower's total cost of obtaining funds; the investor must deduct
from the market yield enough to cover the incidental expenses entailed
in holding his investment, and the borrower must add enough to cover
the costs of marketing his securities. This preliminary definition ofthe
basic yield as the yield of the highest grade bonds must be qualified. For
one thing, 'highest grade bonds' must beexplained. Furthermore, a
distinct basic yield must be defined for 30-year bonds, another for 10-
year bonds, still another for 1-year bonds, and so on.
Obviously, 'highest grade' refers to the subjective appraisal of traders
and investors in the bond market, not to intrinsic bond quality. These
traders try conscientiously to determine the intrinsic quality of all
issues traded. The opinions they formfrom analyzing pertinent data
and consulting the ratings of the investment services are neitherinfal-
lible nor unanimous, but are one of the primary forces determiningthe
prices and hence the yields atwhich issues are traded. A bond has a
low yield if niost traders think its quality is high; consequentlythe
highest quality bonds, according to market judgment, are thosewith
the lowest yields
But one should not suppose that a bond is considered high inquality
merely because its yield is low, or that a difference in yield between two
bonds of the same maturity is entirely attributable to adifference in
quality. The yield of any bond may be seriously affected by many extra-
neou influences having nothing to(10 with 'quality', in the sense in
which that word is commonly used.1 Often a bond has specialfeatures
3that riiake it more or less attractive than it would otherwise bc, but that
do not alter the fundamental safetyo interest and principal: tax-exemp-
tioii, WHYCISiOn and warrant privileges,an active sinking fund in some
circumstances, provision for callprior to maturity, voting rights.2 Fur-
thermore, the price of any bondmay be artificially raised or lowered by
ill advised market action of ignorant tradersor by conscious attempts at
manipulation. Accordingly, the basic yieldmust be redefined as the
yield of highest grade bonds free from extraneous influences, bonds that
are non-convertible, non-callable, fully taxable, actively traded, free
from manipulation, etc.
Evidently a successful statistical analysis of the basic yield(lel)endS
upon the possibility of selecting a suitable group of bonds- bon(lS of
superb quality, fully taxable, non-convertible,etc. Such a group can
be found only among high gradecorporate bonds; for governments,
including state and immicipal bonds,are almost universally tax exempt,
and United States Treasury bonds in particularhave, or have had, note
issue and discount privileges, etc. This ismost regrettable: first, because
the quality of the bestgovernments is probably a little higher than that
oF the best corporates; second, because thereseems to be no way of
analyzing the yield differential betweengovernments and corporates to
determine how much is due totax exemption or other privileges and
how much to the quality differential. Obviously,some corporates are
unsatisfactory because of other disturbing influences,but many seem to
be satisfactory enough for significant analysis.
Estimates of basic yieldsserve two interrelated functions:(i) to
measure high grade bond yields, (2) to show the relation of highgrade
long term yields to short term. Sinceexcellent series of long term high
grade bond yields have already beenconstructed, the second function
is probably themore important. This paper is concerned mainly with
presenting basic yield estimates of corporate bonds of allmaturities for
the first quarter of eachyear i 900-42 (see Table i and the basic charts),
describing their derivation, and pointingout their limitations.Al-
though some attention is given theirimplications for general interest
theory and business cycle problems,serious discussion of these subjects
is deferred.Since economic theorists and investmentanalysts alike
are now keenly interested in the relation between longand short term
yields, presentation of the estimatesalone seems justified at this time.
YIELD DATA FROM CORPORATE BOND PROJECT
The Corporate Bond Projectcompiled price quotations andcomputed
yields for some 3,000 high gradedomestic corporate bondsoutstanding
at some time between 1 qoo andi q38. The distribution of these bonds
by yield and termto maturity is shown in scatter diagramsOn the basic
4charts. These 3,000 include most of the larger andmore actively traded
corporate bonds outstanding in this period. Some of the more impor-
tant types not included are serials, equipment trusts (serial and non-
serial), income bonds, receivers' certificates, domestic bonds primarily
payable in foreign currency, bonds of real estatemortgage companies,
bonds held entirely by affiliates, and bonds thatwere never outstanding
in amounts of $5,000,000 or more.5
Of the total sample of3,000 bonds, merely a small fraction were
actually used in the basic yield analysis. Certaintypes were omitted
TABLE 1




0 -L25f3.253.30' 3.453.60 3.505.25$5.75$5.50$1.054.30
3.97$"" * " " 4.75$4.87$5.10$4.034.25
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1 3.15$ *" 3.81$3.97$4.42$3.98 1.13
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6 3.30 * ' 3.59$3.82$4.21f3.954.07












60 3.30 3.258.30w3.453.60 3.503.55 3.80 3.95 3.753.80
19111912191319111915191619171918191919201921
0 4.10 4.054.95 4.704.502.754.05 5.55 5.75 6.257.25'
1 4.09 4.014.74 4.644.473.48" 5.48 5.58 6.116.94'
2 4.08 4.03.159 4.564.453.81" 5.41 5.43 5.996.70'
3 '1.07 4.024.48 4.534.433.94 5.35 5.32 5.896.51'
4 4.06 4.014.39 4.494.414.00 5.30 5.23 5.806.35'
5 4.05 4.004.31 4.454.394.03 5.25 5.16 5.726.21
6 4.01 3.994.25 4.424.384.05 5.20 5.10 5.656.09
7 4.03 3.984.20 4.394.36 5.16 5.05 5.595.98
8 4.02 3.974.17 4.364.34 5.12 5.02 5.535.89
9 4.02 3.974.14 4.344.33 5.08 4.99 5.475.81
10 4.01 3.964.12 4.324.31 5.05 4.97 5.435.73
12 3.99 3.954.09 4.284.28 4.99 4.93 5.355.60
14 3.98 3.934.07 4.244.26 4.93 4.89 5.295.50
15 3.97 3.934.06 4.224.25 4.91 4.87 5.265.46
20 3.94 3.914.02 4.164.20 4.82 4.81 5.175.31
25 3.92 3.904.00 4.124.17 4.77 4.77 5.125.22
30 3.90 " 4.104.15 4.75 4.75 5.105.17
40 3.90 " 4.104.15 " 4.75 4.75 5.105.15
50 3.90 " 4.104.15 " 4.75 4.75 5.105.15
60 3.90 3.904.00 4.104.15 1.054.05 4.75 4.75 5.105.15a The values in this table are takenat various intervals along a smoothcurve; intermediate values can be determined by interpolation.
* More than usually liable to error.
i-Figures marked with a if) indicateone alternative value; the other is equalto the long term yield (see text).
b 1942 yields are basedon January and February prices.
because they were entirelyunsuited for the analysis;others were omitted
primarily to save labor, butalso because their inclusionwould have added little to the significanceof the results. Thefollowing typeswere omitted:
Bonds wit/i inadequate pricequotations: To be includedin the study for any particularyear, a bond had to haveat least the following fea-
6
I A B L 1;i(concl.)
Years to
Maturity 192219231921192519261927192819291930 19311932
0 5.35 5.055.05 3.301.401.301.05 5.60 1.40 2.353.60t
5.31 5.015.02 3.85 5.27 3.05
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tures in the Iirst quarter: an a(:tual sale 1)11CC or a bid awl an asked quo-
tation in one month, or a bid in each of two mouths. 'I'hese minimum
requirements were preliminary, and later several bonds satisfying tlieiu
were found to be inadequate.
Bonds with quality ratings less than A :6 If a bond had a rating of less
than A in some years and A or better in others, it was included when-
ever its rating was A or better. No distinction by quality was madefor
1900-08, when no quality ratings were available;1 furthermore, a few
unrated bonds were admitted in the subsequent years.
All bonds defaulting at any time during 1900-38.
Convertible bonds: All convertible bonds, except those whose conver-
sion privilege had expired.
Bonds selling above call price: Since investors are justly reluctant to
buy a bond at much above its call price, the prices oh callable bonds (10
not rise as high as the prices of comparable non-callables, and theiryields
do not fall as low. For this reason bonds selling at or above call price
were considered undesirable for the basic yield analysis,and were
omitted for 1900-33. For 1934-42, however, so many bonds were selling
above call that they could not be omitted without seriously reducing
the number of bonds available for analysis; and in the later years of the
period, 1939-42, virtually all long term high grade bonds were selling
above call. For callable and non-callable bonds alike, the yields on the
charts are the yields to maturity.
The increasing prevalence of bonds selling above call (indicatedin
the charts for i 934-40) introduces a very undesirable bias intothe basic
yield estimates for the later years, the effects of which areimpossible to
measure. The price and yield of a callablebond depend upon the in-
vesting public's forecast of when the bond islikely to be called. If an
early call is forecast, the bond will sell close to call price; if a remote
call, it need not sell close to call price. Obviously, it is impossible to
determine what the investing public forecasts for each individualcall-
able bond.
High yield bonds: Judged by the dispersion of their yields. evengrade
A bonds vary considerably in quality. Since the basic yield isthe yield
of the lowest yield bonds, the higher yield bonds, whethergrade A or
better, were not essential for the analysis.It is readily apparent that
bonds above a certain yield were not plotted on most of the basiccharts.
That their OmiSSiOn was no loss to the analysis will be evidentwhen
the method used for fitting the basic yield curves is discussed.
Low yield bonds with spurious yields: When a bond sells at ayield far
below those of other high grade bonds of the same maturity, theyield
usually turns out to be spurious,8 owing to an active sinking fund or
some other disturbing influence. For example,in 1928 the Pittsburgh,
7Chicago, Cincinnati & St.Louis Series E 3.4's of194() yielded 3.ÔrCr cent, and the Erie RailroadPennsylvania Collateral 'Trusti 's ofI 951
yielded 3.8o percent, when other high grades of similarniaturity were
yielding 4.10per cent or more; both these bonds hadextremely active
sinking funds, whichpresumably caused them to sellat exceptionally
low yields. A seriouseffort was made to exclude allspurious-yield bonds
that might affect thebasic yield estimates. Theclearly spurious yields, like the twomentioned above,were excluded. The questionableores
were sometimes included andsometimes excluded, dependingon cir-
cufljstances but even when included,they were given little weight.
In compiling pricequotations, the Corporate BondProject divided
all bonds intotwo groups: 'periodic' bonds,for which price quotations
were compiled, if avajlll,only at 4-year intervalsstarting in 1900, and 'periodic andannual' bonds, for whichprice quotations WereCOfli- piled, if available,for all years in whichthe bonds were outstanding.
Hence thecoverage in 1900, 1904, etc., is betterthan in otheryears, but only slightly betterbecause the periodic andannual bonds were usually the more active issuesand had more reliablequotations.
For each bond sixseparate price quotationswere sought: the high and the low sales pricein each of the firstthree months in eachyear of record. When sales priceswere unavailable, bid andasked quotations
were substituted if available.The yield to maturitywas then deter- mined from theaverage of these six quotations.It was roundedto the nearest twentieth ofa per cent below thetrue yield; that is, all bonds with yields rangingfrom3.60 per cent upto but not including 3.65per cent were roundedto 3.6o per cent; hence theyields in the basic charts are located on theaverage one-fortieth (.025) ofa per cent below their true positions.
OTHER YIELD DATA
The primary dataon corporate bond yieldswere Supplemented by four types of secondary data:the yieldson United Statesgovernment obli- gations; the yieldson high grade serial bonds,paiticularly railroad equipment trust certificates;two previouslyconstrvcted series of long- term high grade bondyields; and threeseries oshort termmoney rates.9 The dataon government obligationsad oncorporate serial bonds have beenadded to the basiccharts. The seriesof long term bond yields and ofshort termmoney rates will be used laterfor com- parison with the basicyield estimates.
THE BASIC YIELD CURVES
The basic yieldcurves show the relationbetween yield andterm to maturity for the highestgrade (lowest yielding)bonds in eachyear
8I 900-42. One of these curves appears oiieach basic chart as a hcavy
solid line, sometimes curved and sometimes straight.The CurveS for all
yeats ale tabulated in Tabic i, whcrcvalues are given for specific'! ma-
turities from o to 6o years, from which the intermediatevalues can 1w
readily interpolated. Each basic yield curve is afree-hand trend line
so fitted that is passes below mostof the yields on the chart butusually
above a few isolated low yields. The choice of curves,it will be ob-
served, has been limited to three general types: (i) ahorizontal straight
line, (2) a smooth curve falling at a decreasing rateuntil it approaches
a horizontal straight line atthe long term end, () a smooth curverising
at a decreasing rate until itapproaches a horizontal straight line.'0One
of these types usually provides a very satisfactoryfit, although in a few
years the fit is somewhat impertect.
The fitting of a free-hand trend line tothe lowest yiCl(l l)OfldS
is a radical departure from acceptedstatistical procedureOrdinarily
the trend line would be designed to showthe variation in the average
yield of bonds of different terms to maturity,and it would be deter-
mined by the method of least squares, orperhaps by some sim1)lCr
method such as the joining of the average yieldfor o-i year bonds with
the averages for i -2 years, 2-3 years, etc.But the traditional a1)prOaCh
is not well adapted to the measurementof the basic yield, primarily be-
cause of our definition: theyield of the absolutely best bonds,that is,
the minimumyield. Furthermore, the statisticalproblem of fitting a
trend line to minimum yield is far moreclear-cut than fitting a line to
average yields.It would be almost impossible tofit a line to the aver-
age of all bond yieldsbecause the yields of the lower grades varygreatly
and sometimes reach astronomicalvalues. It is quite possible tofit a
trend line to some arbitrarily defined groupof high grade bonds, per-
haps Moody's A's or Poor'sA**'s; but even such an average is not
entirely satisfactory because the averagedepends upon what group is
arbitrarily chosen to be averaged.
Of course, one serious danger isencountered in fitting a curve to
the minimum yields - thepossibility that the lowest yields maybe
spurious. Weinvestigated all the lowest yieldingbonds, i.e., all those
below the basic yield orimmediately above it, and eliminated many
with spurious yields.Obviously the investigation could notbe ex-
haustive, for it had to be limited to a fewsuccinct and readily accessible
sources of information,such as Moody's and Poor'smanuals; neverthe-
less, it did suffice to unearth manyclearly spurious yields and some
rather questionable ones. We assumedtherefore that isolated low yields,
substantially below those of other bondsof the same maturity, were es-
pecially likely to be spurious; andindeed some were found to bedefi-
nitely suspect, even though notclearly spurious; for example afew
c)inactively traded over-the-counterbonds that repeatedly had isolated
low yields.'' Itwas because of this danger that the basic yield curves
were fitted, not to the absolutely lowest yields, but.to the lowest points
at which the yields were at all concentrated.Fundamentally, the fitting
of the basic yieldcurves consisted in drawing a boundary between two
regions on a chart:an upper region throughout which yields were
thickly scattered anda lower region in which they were sparsely scat-
tered or non-existent
RELIABILITY OF THE BASIC YIELDCURVES
All measurementsare subject to error, because of limitations inherent
in even the best measuringapparatus, inadequacies of available data,
imperfections in technique, andoccasional negligence on thepart of
the investigator. Nomeasurement is significant unless something is
known of thenature and amount of the errors to be reasonablyexpected in it. The poteitiaIerrors in the basic yieldmeasurements are both
numerous and diverse, buta rough estimate of their size is possible.
Errors in the basic yieldcurves may arise from errors in the indi-
vidual bond yields. Strictlyspeaking, these individualerrors can arise
from only twosources: the rounding of all yieldsto the nearest .05 per
cent below the true yield, which is almostnegligible, and the actual mis-
calculation of yields, which islikely to be rare.'2 Broadlyspeaking, in-
dividual yieldsmay err in other ways. Bond yields,as already pointed
out, may be spurious because of allsorts of extraneous influences: anda
spurious yieldmay be properly considered anerroneous yield for the
purposes of this study. The size of theseerrors is hard to estimate. Our
practice has been to omit all questionablebonds, such as convertibles,
rather than to attempt thealmost impossible task ofmeasuring the effect of the disturbingfeature upon the particularquestionable yield. The omission ofquestionable yields, however, hadto be limited to
the more obvious, andmany of the less obviousmay have been over-
looked. Furthermore, all yieldsprobably have at leasta small spurious
elemelit, an error forour purposes and practicallyunmeasurable.
Errors may also arise from variationsin quality. Although thebasic yield estimatesare all intended to represent uniformlyhigh grade
bonds, both for differentyears and for different terms tomaturity, it is
perfectly conceivable that the bestbonds of 1 940, the lowestyield triple A's, may bea little better or a littleworse than the best bonds of1920,
or of any other year; and it is alsoconceivable that the best3o- to
year bonds of 1924 may be considerablybetter or worse thanthe best
0- to 5-year bonds or the best10- to 15-year bonds. There is littlecvi-
clence to indicate therange of the possible variation inquality between years, but it is probablynot wick. However; the variationin quality between maturitygroups may be considerable.
10Because high grade bonds arc not uniformly distributed by maturity,
gaps often occur in maturity groups with virtually no high grade bonds.
Sonic are clear and distinct, pcisting for years. For example, during
the Inst decade of the century very few high grade bonds were to mature
between 1955 and iqqo.' This gap was considerably narrowed by 1926
With the appearance of some i 955-70 maturities, and it was fairly well
closed by 1930. Another gap began to appear about 1935 for l)OfldS
maturing in 2000 or later because the longer term bonds were being re-
tire(l or were going into default during the 'thirties and weic benig re-
placed by new shorter term issues. 'The long term bonds continued to
disappear in the next few years, and the gap widened, until by 1940
there were virtually no high grade bonds maturing after i that is,
in more thanyears.
Other gaps, less clear and persistent, occurred from time to time.
Ihie first quarter of i 926 saw many triple A maturities of 8 to i 4 years,
but the lowest yields were .25 per cent higher than the lowest yields in
other maturities. Was this a quality gap or a genuine variation in the
basic yield?1)id the 1926 market think that the best 8- to 14-year
maturities were a little lower grade than the others, or (lid it prefer the
others for reasons having nothing to do with quality?
The basic yield curves were fitted with a view to filling these gaps
by simple. continuous curves. In effect, many of the more questionable
basic yields were determined by interpolation or extrapolation from a
few well defined points. All during the first part of the century the basic
yields for the non-existent 1955-90 maturities were interpolated be-
tween the values for the longer and shorter maturities: during the last
half of the 'thirties, the basic yields for the non-existent maturities of
40 years or more were extrapolated from the yields of 30-year bonds;
and in i 926, as in similar situations, the basic yields for the questionable
area between 8 and 14 years were interpolated rather than determined
by the lowest yields prevailing in that area. Whether this interpolation
is justified is anybody's guess. Certainly it has the advantage of sim-
plicity as well as that of eliminating any small, extraneous variations
in quality; but it also has the great disadvantage of concealing genuine
variations in the yields of the highest grade bonds.
The potential errors are too numerous and varied to be mcastirecl
individually and then summed up. What is needed is a single criterion
for estimating all errors, and such a criterion can be found, 1)erha1)s, in
the closeness with which the basic yield curves fit the lowest yield bonds.
As already stated, the litting of the basic yield curves is an attempt to
determine a boundary line between two areas on a chart: an area that
contains bond yields and an area that (toes not.hi some charts the
boundary is clear and distinct; in others it is vague and uncertain. For
example, the yields of the lowest 26 bonds in 1928 are confined to a
III
stulj) between f.o5 andj. 15C1' cent, whereas the yields of the lowest
2() bonds in 1902 are spreadover a strij) between 2.90 and 3.50 per
cent. As a result, the basic yieldcurve for 1928 can be fitted with ease
and considerable confidence,but the Cui'Vc forI 902 is fitted with diffi-
culty and some uncertainty.The difference, however, is purelyone of
degree. An clement ofuncertainty inheres in bothcurves, but is muCh
greater, perhaps five timesgreater, for the 1902 curve than for the 1928.
Certainly all the estimatesare subject to an error of at least .05 per
cent, for an error of thisamount could arise fromrounding all yields
to .05 per cent. Whenever thebasic yield is a straight line, it isquoted
only to .oper cent; and whenevem' it isa curve, the long term end ap-
P'oachcs a value quotedto .05)CI' cent. Of course, values along the
curved lines are quotedto .01 per cent, but this is merely for thesake of
obtaining a sniooth(:Ilrve: there is no implication whatsoever that the
estimates arc correct to.0 i per cent. An error of only.o cent, how-
CvCr, is too tiny to expectcXceJ)t in a few ideal years, suchas 1928. In
most years. i cent is more reasonable, and inone or two years with
more scattered yields, suchas 1902, .25 per cent is entirely possible.
Furthermore, CurveS thatare fairly reliable in general often haveareas of considerableuncertainty. In the 1 926curve, for example, where the
potential error formost of the curve may beno more than .05p' cent, there is anarea between 8 andi1years where the potentialerror is probably as largeas .25 per cent; and again in allthe curves for1935-42 there are extremelyuncertain areas at the longterimi ends.
The more doubtfulestimates of basic yieldsarc indicated on Table
i by asterisks, whichappear on the long term rates afteri 931, on some of the short termrates, and for the entireyear 1902. On the charts,
doubtful sections of thebasic yieldcurves are indicated by broken lines
(note some of the shortterm yields and the longterm yields after 1935).
S1'ECIAL ERRORS IN THESHORT TERM ESTIMA1'ES
The short terra baucyields are subjectto numerous specialerrors in addition to those of thelonger term yields.In the first place,price fluctuations of an eighth ofa point, the usual limitto which prices are quoted, have an importanteffect on the yield ofa short term bond.' For a pricerange of 99/8 to iool/8, the yieldrange for a 30-year,4 per cent bond is to 4.007 per cent, which isnegligible; for a1-year, 4 per cent bond therange is 3.88 to 4.13 percent, which is appreciable and for a 3-month,4 per cent bond the range is 3.48to 4.48 pU cent, which is considerable'umrthermore the shortterm bond yield is often equally sensitiveiO daily changes in termto maturity. At loii/8a month, 6 percent bond yields 1.48per cent. If the priceremains con- stant for one week, the yieldwill be 1.12per cent; if the p'ce thenfalls
12to toi, the yield will rise toi .64 r' cent. Obviously, if short term
yields are to be studied satisfactorily, they can be studied onlyon a day
to day basis. Our p'actice of determining the yield From a three-month
average price is patently unsatisfactory, and is justified by reasons of
economy alone.
The sensitivity of short term yields to price fluctuations indicates
that brokers' commissions should be taken into consideration. At the
time of writing, as it has been for some time in the past, the commission
charged non-members trading on the New York Stock Exchange is $2.50
per $i,000 bond,16 which means that when a bond is traded at 100, the
buyer pays 100¼, and the seller receives 9q,4. Fora i-year 4 Pcent
bond, the yield is3.7per cent to the buyer, 4.00 per cent at the market
price, and 4.25 per cent to the seller. Thus, the broker's commission
introduces a very real margin of uncertainty into all short term yield
calculations, a margin that increases as the bond approaches maturity.
Short term bond yields are affected also by the exchange privilege. I
Holders of a maturing bond may be given the option of receiving cash
or another security in payment. This privilege may be valuable and
have considerable effect on the yield. For the last eight years, maturing
Treasury bonds and notes have sold at a negative yield because of the
exchange privilege. Consequently, the yields on short term Treasury
bonds and notes are a very poor index of short term yields as a whole.
To what extent corporate bond yields are similarly affected is hard to
say.Ordinarily corporate bond holders do not enjoy the exchange
privilege, but sometimes they do: and whenever they are led to expect
the privilege, correctly or incorrectly, the yield is likely to be affected.16
A few bonds were omitted because the yields apparently showed expec-
tation of an exchange option, but such situations cannot be appraised
readily.
The determination of short term bond yields is further complicated
by the fact that the population of short term bonds is small and con-
tinually changing. At any one time it is unusual to find iiiore than about
six high grade bonds within a year of maturity, and often no more than
one or two. In several charts, there are simply not enough short term
bonds from which to estimate the basic yields. A case in point is 1932,
where two separate short term estimates are given. One is merely the
extension of the horizontal straight line at 4.70 per cent, a reasonable fit
in view of the bond yield data available. The other, which starts at 3.60
per cent and rises to 4.70 per cent at io years, is fitted to thecommercial
paper rate of about 3.80 per cent during the first quarterand to two
isolated low yields, 4.05 per cent at i year and 4.10 per cent at 2 years
and 4 months. Although the second estimate is probably better, both
ale so extremely uncertain that they are indicated by brokenlines rather
13S
than by the usualsolid line. A similarstate of affairs is hund in 1900,
1906, 19o7. and 1908.
If an error of.05cent is to be allowed for even the best ofthe
long term basic yields,a much larger error must be allowed for theshort term. Atyear to maturity the basic yieldcurve is presumably subject
to an error of at least.25 per cent; and in t11C questionableyears, such as Ian error of i PI cent wouldnot be surprismg. Although the
basic yieldcurves have been extended all theway down to o years to
maturity, and althoughvalues for two and threemonths can be ob- tamed tO .oiper cent by interpolationthere is no implication that
these extremel)' shortterm estimates are at allprecise.
LNGTERI BASIC YJELJ)SANI) OTHER CORI'ORATEBONI) SERIES
Thecomparison in Chart Iis not entirelysatisfactory, because the basic yield series refersto a fixcd, definiteterm to maturity (o years), where- as both the Macaulayand Moody-Standardseries are averages of long termbonds of widelydiverse maturitics.'One of the most strikingfea- tures of Chart iis the extrelnel)'close correlation betweenthe Macaulay series and the basicyields; the maximumdeviation is .21l)e1 cent, the average deviation .075per cent. This is notstrange, for the two series
were designed to show preciselythe same thing- the yield on top grade bonds- although the methods by whichthey were derivedare intrin- sically different. Thebasic yieldswere nevertheless not derivedentirely independently of theMacatilay series. Whenthe first P1'elimiriarybasic yield estimateswere compared with theMacaWay series, severalincon-
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4sistencies were discovered: when the Macatilayrose Iroiii one year to
the next, the basic yields fell, or vice versa. Often these inconsistencies
were irreconcilable, the basic yield data being clearly at variance with
the Macaulay estimates. But whenever the mconsistencics seemed to
be due largely to uncertainties in the basic yield data, the l)aSic yields
were revised, usually by .05 per cent, never by more than .10 per edit.
As the Moody-Standard series is based on the average of a group of
yields rather than the minimum yield, it naturally is uniformly above
the basic yields. The difference ranges from .78per cent in igoo to
.07 per cent in 1933. But the significance of the comparison is the direc-
tion of the year to year changes, not the absolute differences; in37 of thc
42 year to year movements the two series rise and fall together.
TREASURY BONDS AND BASIC YIELDS
In 192 1the yield of Treasuries was only about .07 per cent below the
basic yield;fl1929,1930, and 1933 the difference was aboutiper
cent; by iit had narrowed to about.t per cent; and by 1940 it had
widened to .4 per cent. Conceivably this difference could be due to a
variation in the quality differential between governments and corpo-
rates; if so, the significance of the basic yield estimates would be con-
siderably reduced. Fortunately, however, there is good reason to be-
lieve that at least some of the difference is due to other factors. For
example, the retirement of Treasuries during the late 'twenties would
help to explain their low yield relative to that o corporates. Moreover,
any change in income tax rates is likely to affect the value of the tax
CHART 2
BASIC YIELDS AND UNITED STATES TREASURY BOND YIELDS
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YEARexemption privilege. 10 explain why there is a difference between the
yield of Treasuries and the basic yieldor why it fluctuates widely is
beyond the scope of thispaper. %\Ic merely call the reader's attention
to Chart 2, where the movements of the 20-year basic yields and the
yields of similar Treasury bondsare traced.'8
LONG AND ShORT TERM BASIC YIELDS
Despite large errors inherent in the shortterm estimates, Chart 3 shows
clearly that the short term yieldsare far more unstable than the long
term; for the fluctuations of the short term estimatesare too violent to
attribute to errors alone.'9 In periods ofpronounced stress the short
term yields rise higher, and in periods ofextreme easy money they fall
lower. This greater instability of the shortterm yields is shown in
another manner in Chart,'where all the basic yield curves forioo-42
have been superimpose(Ion a single chart.
CHART 3
LONG AND SHORT TERM BASICYIELDS.. 19O0 -
SHORT TERM BASIC YIELDS AND OTHER SERIES
Many investigators have concludedthat boiid yieldsare not closely
linked to short termmoney rates. One reason is that longterm bond
yields have usually been used. Amore pertinent comparison, made
possible by the basic yield estimates,is between short termmoney rates
- commercial paper, time money, and callmoney - and short term
bond yields (Chart 5).20 Whileall four series divergefrequently anti
sometimes widely, they neverthelesstend to correspond in their major
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YEAR '4080bitt after 1 qo8 the correspondence is marked. All four series move up
and down together from 1909 to Up 6: commercial paper atabout the
same level as the basic yield, time money alittle lower, and call money
still lower. In 1916 each series was either at, or very close to,its low
for the first sixteen years of the century. From these lowsall four series
rose sharply to their highs of theearly 'twenties, call and tinic money
reaching theirs in i 920, and commercial paper and thebasic yield reach-
ing theirs in 1921. From 1922 to1928 all four series moved closely to-
gether. All four then rose to new peaks in 1929; thebasic yield and
commercial paper moderately, time and call money sharply.The series
then fell together to their extreme low levels of i 935-42.
The relations depicted in Chartmust be reviewed in the light of
the fundamental weaknesses of the short term basicyields.All the
short term estimates arc subject to an appreciable error, SOHIC to a con-
siclerable error.In several years, when short term high gradel)ofl(IS
were too few for an accurateestimate of the basic yield, the estimate was
partly determined by the commercial paper rate. in yearslike 1900,
iqo6-o8, or 1932, we simply do not know what thebasic yield was for
CHART 4

















114'tS 10 IIAIUPITYshort terms: itmay have been close to theCommercial paper rate.as we assumed, 01' ii may havel)CCfl quite different.Consequently we (10 nOt auempt to decide whctheisIloli. term bondsagree more closely with
Commercial paper, timemoney, or call money;we content ourselves with the conclusionthat short termbond yieldsare a good (Teal more closely relatedto short termmoney rates than are longterm l)Ond )'iel(IS.
CHART 5
SHORT TERMMONEY RATES,1900 -1942 PERCENT








IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASICYIELD ESTIMATES
This paper isconcerned with a single function:to present the basic
yield estimates andexplain how theywere derived. Nothing has been
said about their implicationsfor current economicand financial prob- lems, and very little abouttheir relevanceto interest theory. Anex- haustive exploration oftheir significance wouldbe out of place here;
we merely mention a few specificquestions that deserveserious consid- eration in the future.
THE RELATION BETWEENLONG AND SHORT TERMBOND YIELDS
The basic yield estimatesdo not revealany simple fundamental relation
between long and shortterm yields. During the lastyears, short term yields have beensometimes above, sometimesequal to, and sometimes










65)greater than long, and in periods of extremely tight money,such as
1929, 1918-2 i, and possibly i qo6-o8, they wereconsiderably above long.
One pertinent extension of the basic yield analysis would be to make
estimates for the other three quarters. If monthly estimates were feas-
ible, they also would be extremely useful.
The relation between long and short term yields is intriguing to
modern economic theorists, who have advanced several theories to ex-
plain it.One explanation relates long term yields to the expected
course of future short term yields; if short termyields are expected to
rise substantially, long yields will be greater than short, and vice versa.
Another explanation is Mr. Keynes' doctrine of liquidity preference, by
which short term bonds normally yield less than long. Finally, therela-
tion between long and short yields is sometimes explained byinstitu-
tional forces. The market fcr hort term funds is conceived asintrin-
sically different from that for long term; different groups ofinstitutions,
with different needs and trading practices, operate in each market;and
the prices and yields in each market are set by the conditions ofsupply
and demand within it.
BOND YIELDS ANJ) BOND PRICES
Throughout this study we have dealt with bond yields, tothe exclusion
of bond prices. This is perfectly sound according toeconomic theory,
which is interested in prices and price movementsonly so far as they
determine yields and yield movements; but it is not sosound according
to practical finance. Bonds arequoted on the exchanges in terms of
price, not yield. They are bought and sold by personswho are vitally
concerned with price movements: by speculators hoping torealize a
quick profit; by long term investors who must facethe possibility of
forced liquidation at unfavorable market prices; byinstitutional iflVCS-
tors, who must have regard for the marketprice when making out their
annual statements. To the economic theorist, afall in price of a 3o-year
3 per centbond from 100 to 90 means a rise in yield from 3 toabout
3.5 per cent; tothe bond holder it means a io per centcapital loss.Be-
cause bonds are bought andsold by persons acutely aware of price move-
ments, a comprehensive study ofbond yields should go behind theyields
themselves and consider prices.Perhaps a yield-maturity curvethat
cannot be explained in terms ofyield alone, is quite explainablein
terms of market price behavior.
While we do not propose to explore thisimportant subject of price,
we have neverthelessconverted four of the basic yield series inTable i
into equivalent basic price series in Table 2.One of the yield series,
iqo, has equal yields forall terms; one, 1929, has higher short terni
yields; and the last two, 1941 and 1942, havelower short term yields.
19From these basic pricecurves a few general observations can be made.
When the basic yieldcurve is a horitontal straight line, as in I 930,a to!)
grade bond witha coupon rate greater than the basic yield sellsat a
l)remium that gradually decreasesas it approaches maturity, and a born!
with coupon rate lessthan the basic yield sellsat a discount. When the
basic yield isa curve that either rises or declines continuously,the cor-
responding price curvemay rise for a while, then decline,as does the
bond in 1942. Especiallyinteresting behavior is shown by the price
curves forper cent bonds in 1941 and1942; the price is almost con-
stant (about 109 iniqi and 107 in 1942) for all maturities longer
than 6years; for shorter maturities the pricerapidly declines to par.
T A B 1. F.2
Basic Prices of CorporateBonds Con'cspondingto Basic \'iclds
First Quarter,929-3(1 and 194 l-12,by Term to Maturity
COUPON RATE AND ITS EFFECTON YIELD
At present,many interest theoristsassume that bonds having thesame quality and maturityshould sell at thesame yield.But alert bond traders, especially tradersin United States Treasurybonds, drawa dis- tinction between bonds withdifferent couponrates; ordinarily a low coupon bond is preferredto a high coupon bond of thesame maturity. and it may sellat an appreciably lower yield.One commonly heardex- planation is that lowcoupon bonds are preferable forincome tax pur-
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140.45seem to fedthat in a declining market, prices fall fairly freely until
they approach paI, at which point theymeet resistance to further
decline.
The basic yield estimates were all made without regardto Coupon,
no distinction being drawn between 2 and7 le cent bonds. This fail-
ure to distinguish between low and high coupons is certainly a short-
coming, though it may not be serious. Corporate bondsare affected by
so many disturbing influences, and their yields vary so widely that the
particular effects of differentcoupon rates are probably unmeasurable.
In a study of Treasury bonds, however,a distinction by coupon would
be far more feasible, and certainly desirable;one yield-maturity curve
could be constructed for2 per cent bonds, another for 21/2 per cent
bonds, etc.
INVESTMENT POLICY
One of the problems facing investors today is the proper arrangement
of maturities within their portfolios. Because of the low yieldon short
term bonds, liquidity can be obtained only at the expense of income.
How can one portfolio be designed to provide both adequate liquidity
and a substantial income? One solution is to stagger maturities so that
regular amounts come due at regular intervals. Another is to buy
med luin term bonds, hold theni for a while, then sell them a few years
before maturity. This procedure will produce an extraordinarily high
yield for a mediumterm portfolio as long as the present structure of
bond yields continues unchanged. For example, a 21/8 per cent bond is
bought at aboutj3,/ to yield 2.16 per cent, which is the basic yield in
1942; after five years it is sold at 1021/2 to yield 1.57 per cent, again
the basic yield in 1942. For the five-year period, the yield from interest
and price appreciation amounts to 2.65 per cent, which is as high as the
basic yield on the longest term bonds. Although we took as an illustra-
tion a low coupon bond selling at approximately par, the results would
have been the same for a high coupon bond selling at a substantial pre-
mium.
THE MARKET RATING
One of the primary functions of the basic yields was to serve as a stand-
ard with which the yield of any bond could be compared. The differ-
ence between the yield of any particular bond and the basic yield was
conceived as a possible measure of the bond market's appraisal of risk.
If a bond is considered extremely safe, its yield should approximate the
basic yield; if it is considered risky, its yield should differ from the basic
yield by an amount depending upon how risky it seems. Whether this
yield differential will provide a useful tool in the analysis of bond qual-





i The isord 'artificial' may not he
is that he trite price of a bond is
sell it. Ohviouslv the market price
the mistakes of ill advised traders,
tions of manipulators, who do,
Notes
1 In ordinary investment isage 'quality' relet s to lie I kcl iltood that a I oiul 'sOtt t racted payin cuts
of principal and interest will not default, and as such it does not refer to the attractiveness of the
houtl as an investmemu or a speculation: for a high quality bond will tie tiliat tract ivc if the price
is too high, and almost shy low quality bond is a speculative bargain at sonic price. Tuecoilver-
sion p1 ivi lege. or aily other sisee ial fea Eli IC, may makea bond of aisy q tial it y attractive when it
would otherwise not be. Convertibles frequently sell ata price to yield little or nothing or even
less than not lii ng to ust (In t:a nilI hcv (10 so not l)eca tue t hey ate des ira Ide obligations for con-
set vative investors, which t hey jiiaor tllanot lie, li tlies :titse t hey represent a spectilat ive value
for those who want to convert. L5'i(IeIit h-titi' yield ol a convertible bond is composed of at least
hi-cc pts :t lie basic yield or lii gb grade Isorid eleinci it. plus ti iretii 111111 for ow quality if the
bond is less r ban tol) giade, pain usan a,iIou It rcprcscitt lug tite value of the conversion privilege.
The same general aitalssjs holds for bonds withother special features.
It will he argued, and rightly, that a sitiking fitial usually improves the quality ofa bond. tinder
sonic cii cunistalices, however, it may sIi)poi-t t he of a hood without tsppieciablv affect lug its
qttali t. For exatuple. if amini is adequately covered, atil has a si tikiug [tind providitig lor the
(all lug of a s ubstan t ja I n umber of hotids each'car at a tirermi iii in, say 110, its attract tvCtieSs the-
rives li-out ret i ieltic'nI at 110 iiistc'ad ofpat. not froni the periodic reduction of the company's
i fldcbte(lness,
Ctiti rda 1)Proplatc in this context. The in tended implication
the price at which weil informed tradet-s are willing to buyor
may tcinporanly deviate ftoiii the true prue, thus defined, by
who tbnot know what the title price is. or by the machina-
i l'lie Cot i°°P.omid I't oject dealt exclusively with 1)Ofl(lS otttstandingat some time between
jaunais I. 191)1) and l)eceinber 31, 193$; however, it did obtainthe prices and yields for 1939 and
1940 of bonds outstanding at the close of 1938. 'lIme datafor the 1939 and 1940 estitisates there-
fore do not include the yields of bonds offered during1939 or the first quarter of 1910.
The data for the 1911 and 1912 estimateswere compiled alter the Corporate Bond Project
ltad closed. Fiisi. the Projest 's list of hiomitls for19-10 was consulted, and about 1)10 of the higher
grade. lowerield bonds were selected: then about 50 other bonds,including some that had been
issued sitwe 193$ and sonic that had imuprovetlin rating, were added. The list consisted almost
exclnsis'clv of hotids traded on the New York StoikExchange or the New York Curls. The data
for 19 12 wei e based on only Jantlarv and Fehirus rv prices, because \farch prices CoL!l(l not hecom-
piled before t lie Pu 1)1 lea t 1011 (late.
5 The Project obtained a 10 per cent sample of these smallerIiontls. which numbered abotti 1.500;
hut since pi-ice data wet-c ttsiial lv missing. t Ii is saw tilewas hot used in the basic yield analysis.
6 The rating system used here is a composite basedott the mediati average of the ratings b' fotir
ptoniiiierit investnicut services. Whmeii some of these tatiogswere not available, as they fre-
quently were not. (lie (omiil)osite was determined front thoset hat were.
' The first bond quality ratings, Moody's railroads, appearctliii 1909.
8 Like 'aitificial', 'spurious' may not lie entirely appropriate in thiscontext. The implication is
that the yield to maturity, which is what we are dealing with excltisively. issotnetinics a sptiriotls
measure oflie expected investment return. Ordinarily t lie investing publicexpects that a high
grade bond will be paid at par oii the Inst ti nv date; l)tttsomiict bitest lie pithi ic feels confident
that mIte bond will lie paid before nsa t tin t v and ata picmn ium.
An excellent illustration of a spttrious yield is afforded by the ErieRailroad l'ennsylvania
Collateral Trust l's of 1951. Every year a simiii ofmoney, depeiiditig upon (lie amount of coal




to Ie used to itity 1)011(15 iii the (pelt iiiaiket iiI hey nitild he bight at 105 or less: a; lierwise the
IbindS Wet C tO hc en Ilci II)lot at 105. The fund operated so rapidly thatlie en ti ic issue had
been retired by 1938.
In 19281ic bond liokier must have teal izesihat his!sotoi Was wort !iinure titan its lace
value. He did not expect to receive exactly par for his bond 23 years hence, whicli wOuld provide
a yield of 3.80 per cent at market plices; he could reasonably expect to receive 105 in much less
than 23 years, which would provide a yield of substantiall\more than3.80 cent. It is in this
sense that 3.80, time yield to maturity, is considered spurious.
9 Henry C. Murphy of the United States Treasury very kindly lent the Natioutsl Bureaua set of
curves showing the relation between yield and tern; m maturity for governtneiu securities. These
curves, which were prepared by Virginia Eyre from pricelata as of the end of January each
yeas-, were used as models lot a similar set reproducer! here in the basic charts. In drawing her
curves, Miss Lyre plotted the yield of each security individually; she used a separate curve [or
long term bonds aad short term notes; and she left spaces where there were no yields. This pro.
ccdurc was admirable when the uirvcs were plotted oil charts by themselves, but it would have
added unnecessary confusion to the already complilated charts used in this study; henceour
curves arc greatly simpli!Ictl imitations of Miss Eyre's oiigiiials.
'1 heoretically, serial bonds are ideally suitedto the study of the yield-maturity relation,
Actuallthe' are rather unsatisfactory because of the dilliculty of oblainnitig coniprclseiisis-e price
(l(totatiolIs. We have, however, l)ccn ablc to wnispile sonic satisfactory data on serials front three
sources an(l have used them to supplement the more extensive data ott non-serials.
Stroud & Co. permitted its to usc (heir periodic valuations of railroad equipment trust
certificates. Based ott marker prices and other pertinent information. these valuations represent
Stroud's estimate of conservative investment value for cachi maturity of all the important equip-
Inent trust certiutcates outstanding. The Corporate Bond Project computed yields corresponding
to Strotid's price valuations for the highest grade issues. Front among these one issue was chosen
for each year 1931.40. the choice having two ends in view: (I) that the yield should be as low as
possible; (2) that there should be as long a series of nsattlrities as possible.
A search was macIc [or data on high grade equipment trust offerings. Offerings during
January, February, and Marchwere preferred, but when these were not available, others
were taken. The sources were advertisements inthe Contme,cial and Financial Chronicle,
circulars from underwriting houses, and occasionally Moody's and Poors manuals. For about
half the offerings investigated, the prices antI yields [or the individual maturities conk! be deter-
mined; for the remainder, the prices were au average for all maturities. When data on several
offerings were available for one year, only one was chosen, except when several issttes were
offered at precisely the same prices. The choice was niatle with a view to obtaining a high grade.
low yield issue with as many maturities as possible. Offerings were not alwa)s plotted, even when
available, because the)' would have added little to the analysis. Before ahoett 1929 both long and
short term equipment trusts were usually offered at substantially the same yield.
In 1941 and 1912 the United States Steel Corporation had a large issue of serial debentures
outstanding,1.0tnature semi-annually until 1955. They were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and actively tiaded. The yields of these debentures, plotted distinctively on the basic
charts, provided excellent tnaterial [or the analysis.
10 An occasional cusp in the basic yield curves at the 30-year point is due entirely to the change
in scale at that point.
ii Chief among these were the United New Railroad and Canal 3½s of 1951 and the Morris
and Essex 3i/s of 2000, both of which repeatedly had very low yields. In addition, low yields were
occasionally shown by the Michigan Central3'/2of 1952(low in 1903), the Philadelphia.
Baltimore and Washington 4s of !0l3 (low in 1907 and 1915), and the Philadelphia and Reading
4s of 1947 (low in 1919).
12 Bond Project procedure provided thatall price transcriptions and yield calcitlations be
thoroughly checked once, and that marty be spot-checked in addition. This in itself would he
sufficient to assure considerable rliahility. Btut during the basic )ield study, all low yield bonds
were atmalyzed to determine whether their yields were spurious, and this analysis included a
fttrther check of the price transcriptions anti the yield calculations.
23I a l)lCs p cpai cd fromtIme Corporate loud I' roject dam a shed In tImerIi g ItonI hese gaps.
One, sunminariiej heloss', shows the distril,utimi of railroad, public utility, and industrial ohlec-
ings of S5,000,000 or more, of all grades,by term to maturity(ternt measured from offering
tlate). Evidently oflerings maturing in50 to 75 years have never been popular. and since 1920








14 l'his does notmean to imply that bond lricarc not occasionally quoled to 1/is or even 14,a.
15 Of course, thecommission charged members of the Exchangefor their own account is less than S2.50. As a result,no analyst can determine what comnsissioilswere charged oil any par- ticulamtransaction, l)tlt he cannot thereforeforget commissions, Just before thicpaper went to the commissiom on smalltransactions wele increased.
1Even when no exchange privilegeis proviled in the 1,011(1 indeiituii-e,an exchange may' be offeredto ladlitate refunding. For example,about 1900 J.P. Morgan and Co. undertook to market for the New York Centrala large issue of 3Vs maturing in 1997. These Stjswere issued front time to time for refundingand other purposes. When tIme NewYork amid Hudson River 6s and 7s of 1903 came due.Morgan olfered the new 3hs inexchange.
17 See Sonic Theoretical ProbkmsSuggested by1/mi'Movements of InterestRates. Bond Yields and Stock Prices in theUnited States sinCe 1856, by FrederickR. Macaulay (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938).'Ihe chart shows an average forJanuary, February, and Match of the series of adjusted railroadbond yields in Table 10,pp. A 141-61.
The Moody-Standard series isa composite based on Standard Statistics'series of high gra(le railroad bond yields from 1900to 1919, Moody's Aaa railroad bondyields from 1920 to 1930, Moody's Aaa public utilities from 1931to 1912. The chart shows averages forJanuary, February, and March.
IS 'T'he Treasury bond yields hereplotted arc determined from theTreasury bond yield curves on the basic charts. The value of thecurve for 20-year maturities is the valueused in Chart 2.
itt The 6-month basic yieldswere cleterriiincd graphically from thecurves on the basic charts. They can also be interpolated between the valuesfor 0 years and 1 year in TableI. The vertical bars on Chart 3represent a very subjective appraisal ofthe errors to be allowe(I for in the short term estimates, Theconsiderations entering into thisappraisal can be roughly described. An error of .25per cent, the absolute minimum,Was accepted whenever several well clustered short tCrui yieldswere available. When the short term yieldswere lets' or missing, and when they were greatly' scattered,a larger estimate was taken, theamount de- pending on the number of yields andthe scatter.



















Distribution of Bonds by Yield and Term to Maturity,
and Estimated Basic Yield Curves, 1900-1942
HE BASIC CHARTS present the distribution of corporate bonds by yield
and term to maturity for the first quarter of each year,1900-42.The
estimated basic yield curve is represented on each of the 43 charts by a
heavy smooth curve, often a straight line. A broken line indicates that
the basic yield curve is considered highly uncertain. In! 900, 190,.
1907. igo8. and i 932, for example. the yield for the shorter termbonds
is represented by two curves, both broken lines. Likewise, the curve for
long term bonds fori toi 942 1S broken to indicate uncertainty.
All bonds are represented by a solid dot () puol' tO 1909 and for
1941 and i 942.* In other years, a dot is used only for triple A bonds,
and a cross (x) is used for double A, A, and a few unrated bonds. In
the charts for 1934 to 1940 a circle (o) is used for bonds selling above
call price, which were excluded fromall preceding charts.
The horizontal scale on the charts, representing term to maturity,
covers all values from o to qo years. Bonds of more than qo years are
plotted at the qo-vear point, but their true maturities are indicated in
the right-hand margin by a figure, or by the letter P in case of a
tuity. There is a change of scale at the 30-year point. The first section
of the chari, representing maturities from o too years, covers three
times as much space as the second section, representing maturities from
30 to 90 years. As a result, some of the basic curves have a cusp at the
30-year point.
In several years the charts have additional curves showing the rela-
tion between yield and term to maturity for United States government
securities and for certain high grade railroad equipment trust certificates.
* See note1. The task of (leterinining call provisions for1911afl(1 1942 aisd a special set of
average ratings comparable to the Bond Project ratings seemed tinwairanted.
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'-U. S. Gee'! Securitjes
- Four Equip. Trusts offered







































U. S. Govt Securities
Norfolk & Western Equip.
4Ws of 1924
at offering, Mar. 1924 II :! 1925
.: : - $ dlIIII
-
IIi b- j-
-- U. S. Gev't Securites
Missouri Pacific Equip. 5's '0' -




























































-N. '1. Central Equip. 4Vis of 1929










--U. S. Gov't Secerilies
--N.Y. Central Equip. 4½s ci 1930
























































-- U. S. Gov't Sacri1is
Reading Equip. 4½'s 'M(Nov)
valuation by Stroud & Co
Dec. 31, 1934
- Ches. & 0hn Eqsp. 4'af 934
at offering, Sep. 1934
























--u. s. Gov't Securities
Ches. & Ohio Equip. 4½'s
valuation by Stroud & Co.
Mar. 31, 1934
































I Ch. & 0hqutp. of 1930
I valuation by Stroud & Ca. 1.0
Mar. 31, 1934





























Reading Equip. 41.'s,M' iNs0)
valuation by Stroud & Co.
Dec. 31, 1934
Ches. & Ohio Equip. 4'sof 1934
at offering, Sep. 1034











--U S. Govt Securities
Ches. & Ohio [quIp. 3's of 1935
valualionbyStroijd & Co.
Dec. 31, 1935
--Perii. R.R. [quip. 2s'G'
at offering. Dec. 1935
1936
ii
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Y - - U. S. Gov't Securities
--Penn. P.. 8. Equp. 2Ya's '6' / valuation by Stroud & Co. //
Dec. 31, 1936
R.R. Equip. 21/i's 'A' C!inch1ieId





[qp 3's of 1935
valuation by Stroud & Co.
Dec. 31, 1937
& Pacific Equip. 24's '1)'





























U. S. Gov't Securities
--Ches. & Ohio Equip. 3's of 1935
vaivation by Stroud & Co.
Dec. 31, 1938
--Western & Maryland [quip. 2's '6'




























-- (iS. Govt Secijri ies
Penn. R.R. Equip. 2's'J
valuation by SiroudCo.
Dec. 31,1939
Atch., Topeka & Santa Fe Equip. 2f's 'C'r- at offering, Oct. 1939
- U. S. Gov't Securities
Penn. RhEquip. 1's'L'
at offering, Jan. 1941
U. S. S eel Serial Debs
JI rrrT
- - U. S. Gov't Securities
Penn. R. R. Equip. 24's'M'
at offering, Dec. 1941
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